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How Government Reduces
Employment

Murray Weidenbaum
At a time of widespread concern that government is not doing enough to promote employment, we can no longer overlook the other
side of the coin - the many ways in which
government is doing too much, by reducing the
ability of the private sector to create jobs.
Through a variety of legislative mandates on
and regulation of employers, government laws
and rules weaken the demand for labor and,
often, the supply of labor as well. Although
that is not the intent of such legislation, the
rising presence of government in the employment process slows down the growth of employment in the United States. The sad, hard
fact is that more people would be at work if
government were a less conspicuous force in
the American economy.
As will be shown in detail, government, especially the federal government, conducts many
activities which greatly influence the ability of
the private sector to create jobs. The term
private sector is not a misnomer because it
covers non-profit as well as business enterprises. Colleges, hospitals, and museums are
affected as much as business firms. And the
direction of impact is the same and thus cumu-
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lative - each of the government programs discussed below raises the cost of hiring people
and thus discourages the creation of new jobs.
The central point of this study should not be
misinterpreted. The aim is not to oppose efforts to eliminate discrimination, protect unskilled workers, or help the disabled. Rather,
this report is designed to show that, quite unwittingly, much of the government's social
legislation has been written in a way that is
oblivious to its negative impact on employment. If that undesirable side-effect accompanied only one or two of these programs, perhaps it could be soft-pedaled. However, because the harm to employment is so pervasive
and cumulative, it cannot be ignored. Surely,
ways can be developed of meeting these
important social objectives with less economic
damage to the intended beneficiaries. However, the design of specific reforms is beyond
the scope of this study.

I once had the occasion to study a fascinating, unintended phenomenon caused by this
legislation. It turns out that an admonition in
the affirmative action guidebook issued by the
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission - namely, that covered employers
should advertise in media specifically directed
toward minorities - has helped to generate a
new market. An example was the National
Black Register, which charged $85 per column
inch at a time that the Sunday edition of the
New York Times charged $64 an inch to reach
its circulation of 1. 4 million. The Register was
distributed to 42,500 organizations and individuals, a circulation equal to 3 percent of the

Times.l

Of the numerous laws and regulations that
discourage or slow down job creation, the most
conspicuous example is the Civil Rights Act,
including the affirmative action program.
Although most of us do not like to think about
it, this popular law does have some negatives.
For example, it lengthens the amount of time
that many jobs stay vacant. Any employer
subject to affirmative action requirements who
simply goes out and hires people does so at his
or her peril. In order to reduce - but not
eliminate - the likelihood of being sued, prospective employers must go through a lengthy
and expensive process that includes advertising
in spedfied types of media. The advertised
position must stay open long enough to provide
those interested with an adequate opportunity
to respond.

A study of affirmative action induced advertising by colleges and universities in the
mid-1970s concluded that the cost was "at least
$6 million a year, though few professional
placements ever result from such national
advertisements. "2 Even though the outlay is
likely much larger now, this advertising expense seems relatively insignificant when compared with the total cost imposed by the civil
rights laws, including law enforcement, compliance, and resources directed from other
activities. However, to most citizens, $6 million still is a great fortune.
Precise measures of the total costs imposed
by civil rights laws and regulations are illusive.
Nevertheless, Forbes earlier this year came up
with an aggregate estimate of $236 billion a
year or approximately 4 percent of the gross
domestic product. 3 Because the Forbes estimate is so dramatically large, it is useful to
examine its individual elements. For example,
the direct compliance expenses of private
business necessary to respond to civil rights
rules are estimated at a smaller but still substantial amount- $5-8 billion a year. Educational institutions spend $11 billion annually
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Civil Rights Act

for the purpose. These direct costs are clearly
very substantial.
However, the truly huge
costs imposed by these regulations the
remaining $220 billion plus - are indirect,
such as the opportunities foregone because of
the diversion of management time, energy, and
resources.

Wrongful Termination liability
If civil rights laws are an extremely conspicuous aspect of government's impact on the
employment process, judicial narrowing of
employers' right to fire is among the least
publicized. Yet the repercussion of the resultant rise in wrongful-termination liability is
very substantial. The Rand Institute for Civil
Justice has revealed the high costs that have
resulted from the tendency of state courts
around the country to change traditional employment law.
As recently as a decade ago, courts in all
but 13 states continued to recognize the longstanding common-law doctrine that allowed
private employers to fire "at will" workers not
protected by collective bargaining agreements
or specific statutes. In recent years, a virtual
landslide of cases has brought the law closer to
the requirement that an employee can be fired
only for cause. Courts have also been allowing
plaintiffs to collect punitive damages as well as
lost wages when they can prove wrongful
conduct on the part of the employer. Rand
researcher James N. Dertouzos sums up the
findings, "In a nutshell, the efforts of the state
judiciaries to protect workers' job security are
altering employers' hiring and firing practices.
And one of the results is less hiring. "4
A Rand study notes that, due to the substantial costs associated with wrongful termination lawsuits, firms have responded by
treating labor as a more expensive input to

4

production. They estimate that, in the adjustment process, aggregate employment drops by
2-5 percent. 5

Family leave Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
is the most recent example of governmentimposed costs on the employment process. It
is fascinating to recall the debates on the bill as
it wended its way through the Congress.
Proponents kept asking, "How could anyone
object to this obviously desirable measure
which doesn't cost anything?" Just as soon as
the bill became law, we were "reminded" that
employers are required to maintain health
insurance coverage for employees on leave.

The costs of mandated benefits
are ultimately borne by employees
themselves.

The General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates this cost alone at $674 million a year. 6
One area of uncertainty is the ability of
employers to recover the cost of the premiums
they pay to employees who do not return from
the leaves of absence mandated by the new law.
Nor does this estimate cover the money
involved in hiring and training temporary
workers, who may be both more expensive and
less productive than the employees on leave.
Research supports the thesis that the costs
of mandated benefits such as employee leave
are ultimately borne by the employees themselves. MIT economist Jonathan Gruber studied three states that passed laws, effective in
5

1976, requiring basic health insurance to include comprehensive coverage for maternity
expenses.
Gruber estimates that the mandate increased
the cost of insuring women of child-bearing
age by 1 to 5 percent of their wages. He arrived at this conclusion by analyzing data from
the Census Bureau. Gruber found that real
wages of married women of child-bearing age
fell by 3.4 percent between 1974-75 and 197778 in the three states that required maternity
coverage. In striking contrast, real wages for
the same segment of the population rose 2. 8
percent in five control states that did not require such coverage. At the same time that the
"benefited" group of employees suffered a loss
of real wages, employment among married
women of child-bearing age declined. Not
surprisingly, hours per worker in that population category rose. That is a logical response
by employers since the fixed costs of employing these women had risen, regardless of the
length of the work week. 7
Gruber concluded that the increased cost of
this employee-leave mandate was shifted to the
women's wages, or to their husbands' wages if
they had insurance. He found similar effects
from the passage of the 1978 Federal
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which extended
comprehensive maternity coverage to insured
women throughout the United States. 8 In sum,
the enactment of this government mandate
seems to result in lower employment, lower
wages, and higher hours worked.

law in the near future. A recent roundup of
views of various labor economists is not
comforting: 9
Barbara Wolf of the University of
Wisconsin: "You'd expect to see fewer lowwage jobs because it would be more expensive to hire less-skilled workers. There's
reason to be very concerned and very cautious."
Daniel Hamermesh of the University of
Texas at Austin: "Either there are going to
be job cuts or wage cuts or, more likely, a
combination of both."
June O'Neill at Baruch College: "Many
workers will be totally unaffected, but it will
have a serious effect on low-wage workers."
Robert Topel of the University of Chicago:
"Somebody who keeps their job and has
health insurance may be better off. But you
have to think about the millions who no
longer have jobs."

The largest prospective government mandate on employment is health care. At this
point, nobody knows what specific type of
health "reform" will be enacted by the
Congress, or even if such a bill will become

This near unanimity on the part of labor
economists concerning the negative effects of
employment mandates contrasts sharply with
the view of former consultant Ira Magaziner,
the top Clinton health-care adviser, who was
recently quoted as calling worries about job
losses "crazy. "10 Perhaps the Clinton Administration should reexamine its position on
limiting the portion of mental health care to be
covered by its health plan. After all, should it
be enacted, the number of people meeting
Magaziner' s definition of crazy is likely to
skyrocket.
Some analysts have tried to estimate the
employment effects of imposing a health-care
mandate on American business. Professors
June O'Neill and David O'Neill of Baruch
College estimate that the increased cost of
providing workers with health insurance will
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Mandated Health Care

lead to the loss of 3.1 million jobs. Not surprisingly, the O'Neills show that low-wage
industries (such as restaurants) would be hit
very hard. The cost of the Administration's
health-insurance package is likely to be the
same for a highly paid worker as for an employee with a more modest wage scale. Thus,
the researchers estimate that a health-care
mandate will result in an increase of 5 percent
in labor costs in construction and a 19 percent
rise in eating and drinking establishments (see
Table 1).11

The increased cost of providing
workers with health insurance will lead
to the loss of 3.1 million jobs.

As would be expected, other analysts have
come up with different figures on the employment impact of the Clinton health program.
Economist Alan Krueger estimates that the plan
would mean 200,000-500,000 fewer jobs in 10
years than would otherwise be the case; depending on the elasticity of labor demand and
supply; his preference is toward the lower end
of the range. 12 In contrast, presidential adviser
Magaziner believes that "some gain" in
employment is likely in the short run as well as
the long run.13
The short-term effects of imposing a healthcare mandate on employers differ from the
long-run effects in important respects. In the
short-run, the great bulk of the costs (80 percent in the basic Clinton plan) is paid by employers, which should reduce their demand for
labor.
In the longer-run, those costs are
largely shifted back to workers in the form of
lower real wages and reduced nonmedical ben-

8

Table 1
Impacts of Clinton Health Care Mandate

Increase In
Labor Costs
(Percent)

Job Loss

19.1

828,000

Other retailing

7.9

726,000

Construction

5.1

241,000

Personal services

11.3

217,000

Agriculture

15.6

194,000

Private household
services

32.9

190,000

Repair services

8.2

77,000

All other

2.8

627!000

Total Economy

3.8

3,100,000

Eating and drinking
establishments

Source: Employment Policies Institute.

efits. 14 As a result, the effect on the supply of
labor is likely also to be negative. In any
event, the New York Times may have identified
most succinct! y a fundamental shortcoming of
mandating health-care benefits - the lack of
adequate financing: "The tooth fairy, who has
emerged as a major policy player, doesn't pay
for health care." 15

Minimum Wage Legislation

Without doubt, of all the governmental
regulations affecting employment, the statutory
minimum wage has been the focus of the greatest amount of professional attention. With a
few, albeit conspicuous, exceptions, the great

9

mass of the research has concluded that increases in the compulsory minimum wage
cause a rise in unemployment. The segment of
the workforce most affected is those at or near
the minimum wage. This is a group consisting
primarily of teenagers and others with low
skills who thereby lose the opportunity to gain
their initial work experience.16

On the basis of analyzing a great number of
studies, the Minimum Wage Study Commission concluded in 1981 that a 10 percent
increase in the minimum wage generates a 1-3
percent increase in the unemployment among
those holding minimum wage jobs, mainly
teenagers. A smaller adverse effect was noted
for 20-24 year olds, mostly because a smaller
percentage of that age group earns the
mm1mum wage. Confidence in the commission's estimates is enhanced by the fact that the
1981 findings were recently replicated using
panel data from all 50 states over a period of
15 years. 17
What about the workers who manage to retain jobs at the new minimum wage? Here, the
data provide an interesting twist. Many minimum-wage workers are the dependent children
of the middle class. Much of the gain from a
higher minimum would go into surfboards and
stereos, not into rent and baby formula.18
More seriously, several economists have
demonstrated that the benefits of the minimum
wage - to those receiving it - are offset by
reductions in other benefits. For example, a

study of the 1967 rise in the statutory minimum wage showed that workers gained 32
cents an hour in money income, but lost 41
cents an hour in training benefits, for a net loss
of 9 cents an hour in total compensation.19
It is instructive to estimate the effects of the
recent proposal by Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich to raise the compulsory minimum wage
from $4.25 an hour to $4.50. We can obtain a
rough idea of the disemployment effect by
assuming that the past relationship continues to
hold - a 1-3 percent increase in the unemployment of the affected portion of the labor
force for each 10 percent rise in the wage. Let
us apply that ratio to the approximately 5 million affected employees, those now earning
between $4.25 and $4.50 an hour. This procedure yields an increase in unemployment in the
range of 29,500 to 88,500 workers. To those
who dismiss the importance of such small
numbers, it is pertinent to ask when was the
last time they generated 80,000 new jobs- or
20,000- or even 20?
Studies of retail establishments in New
York found that many stores responded to
increases in the minimum wage by reducing
commission payments, eliminating bonuses,
and cutting paid vacations and sick leave. For
every 1 percent increase in the minimum wage,
restaurants reduced shift premiums by 3. 6
percent, severance pay by 6. 9 percent, and sick
pay by 3.4 percent. 20
It must be noted, however, that a distinguished trio of economists has recently come
up with a contrary conclusion. David Card
and Alan B. Krueger of Princeton and
Lawrence Katz of Harvard (currently at the
U.S. Department of Labor) estimate that the 27
percent rise in the statutory minimum wage in
April 1990 had virtually no negative effect on
employment. The three researchers reached
this conclusion after studying the question from

10

11

A 10 percent increase in the
minimum wage generates a 1-3 percent
increase in unemployment.

II

II

several viewpoints - using data on individual
states and on fast-food restaurants in Texas, as
well as examining the impact of the 1988 rise
in the California minimum wage. 21

The disability insurance program
resembles an early retirement system.

As would be expected in the case of research that departs from the conventional
wisdom, many criticisms have been leveled at
these contrary studies. The studies do not take
into account the possibility that some firms
may go out of business because of the cost
increase to them from raising the compulsory
minimum wage. 22 Also, the three researchers
ignore changes in product demand among the
establishments analyzed. Perhaps employment
would have increased had the minimum wage
not been raised. 23 Moreover, the effects of a
rise in the minimum wage may not show up
quickly. Employers need time to make personnel decisions and to substitute machinery
for workers; the studies cover only a year or
two. 24

The first of these two minimum-wage hikes
was less significant. At that time, the minimum wage had not been increased in almost a
decade, and most establishments were already
paying in excess of the federal minimum.
Nevertheless, allowing for this as well as the
fact that some portion of wage increases is
passed on to consumers in the form of higher
prices, their estimated range of possible job
losses associated with the rise to a $4.25 minimum wage is 111,000 to 130,000 jobs. 25 A
study of the federal minimum-wage increases
in an earlier period ( 1979 and 1980) also found
negative effects on employment.
The employed individuals who were affected by the
increases in the minimum wage were 3 to 4
percent less likely to be employed a year
later.26

Other Regulation of Employment

By no means have we exhausted the list of
costs that government imposes on the job creation process in the United States.

The bulk of the evidence continues to support the traditionally negative view of minimum-wage laws. Interestingly, a recent study
has also examined the effects of minimumwage increases on the American restaurant
industry. Using Bureau of Labor Statistics
data from 1980 through mid-1991, they estimate the effects of two minimum-wage hikes
which occurred in 1990 and 1991 (bringing the
minimum wage to $4.25 an hour). They conclude that a 1 percent increase in money-wage
rates reduced employment in eating and
drinking places by 0. 83 percent.

Disability Insurance
Some public-sector actions operate to reduce
the demand for labor, while others decrease the
supply of labor. Let us examine the disability
portion of the social security program
(technically, this is the "D" of OASDI, or oldage, survivors, and disability insurance- the
formal way of describing social security). The
disability program is a cogent example of a
government mandate reducing the labor supply.
Social security disability insurance beneficiaries rarely return to work. Once initial eligibility is established, the program resembles
an early retirement system. In 1987, fewer
than 8,000 disabled beneficiaries - less than
one-half of one percent of the total - successfully completed a trial work period and thus
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stopped receiving their monthly social security
check. 27 In plain English, the more generous
the benefits, the less willing are the recipients
to return to work.
The disability program creates an employment disincentive, encouraging working people
with disabilities to drop out of the labor force
and nonworking beneficiaries to remain out of
the work force. As benefit levels rise, the
number of disabled beneficiaries expands and
the male labor force participation rate declines.
Between 1955 and 1985, for example, the
portion of 45 to 55 year old men not in the
labor force rose from 2.5 percent to 8.2 percent; among 55 to 65 year old males, the ratio
climbed from 12.1 percent to 32.1 percent.28

Education and Labor each held hearings on the
proposed Comprehensive Occupational Safety
and Health Reform Act.
This bill would
amend the existing OSHA statute to require
each employer of 11 or more (an estimated 1.6
million firms) to undertake two new initiatives.
The first is to create a joint labor-management
safety and health committee which is granted
broad authority to influence workplace safety
and health programs. The second is to establish and implement a detailed written safety and
health program.

The pending OSHA bill would preclude
any consideration of economic impact in

OSHA

setting job safety or health standards.

While the disability benefits reduce the
supply of labor, the rules and activities of the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(or OSHA, the small business executive's
favorite four-letter word) operate to reduce the
demand for labor. That feat is accomplished
by increasing the indirect costs of maintaining
a company work force. Virtually every serious
study of OSHA concludes that, although the
costs are substantial, the benefits, if any, are
modest. Most available studies fail to show
examples where the benefits of OSHA standards exceed the costs, although the recent
OSHA hazard communication standard is a
prominent exception. 29
Studies of OSHA performance in the 1970s
concluded that the agency had no statistically
significant impact on worker safety. 30 However, some modest improvement may have
occurred in the 1980s. OSHA now prevents
from 1 to 2 injuries involving at least one lost
day of work per 1,000 workers annually. 31
At the present time, Congress is considering
an ambitious extension of OSHA. In July
1993, the Senate and House Committees on

In addition, OSHA inspectors would no
longer have to go to court in order to get the
authority to order an immediate shut-down if
they considered a business operation unsafe.
Each inspector would have discretion to do so.
Also, the pending bill would preclude any
consideration of economic impact in setting job
safety or health standards. 32
The Employment Policy Foundation has estimated that this package of changes in employment regulation would cost the American
economy nearly $62 billion a year, a figure
representing 11. 8 percent of 1990 net business
income. The major components of this very
large cost estimate are the required new safety
and health programs, training, and committees
(for a total of $38.7 billion). Also significant
are the costs of recordkeeping and reporting
($3. 6 billion) and litigation ($8. 6 billion). The
cost of monetary penalties is estimated at
"only" $90 million annually. 33
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Workers' Compensation
Another expensive burden on the employment process, and one whose cost is rising
very rapidly, is workers' compensation. The
cost of this mandate to U.S. companies is
escalating. In real terms, the cost of workers'
compensation more than doubled from 1977 to
1991. In nominal terms, this required outlay
rose from $14 billion in 1977 to $55 billion in
1991. During the same period, lost work time
due to injuries and illnesses rose far more
modestly, from about 60 days per 100 workers
per year to approximately 70 days per 100
workers. Even taking into account the rise in
unit medical costs, the workers' compensation
program is an increasingly generous one and extremely costly to employers. 34

now receiving about 1,000 ADA claims each
month - on top of its already heavy caseload
dealing with other discrimination claims. 35

Conclusion

Some legislation affecting jobs is so recent
that it is premature to attempt to estimate the
specific impacts on labor costs and on labor
supply or demand. An example is the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which took
effect on July 26, 1992 in the case of
employers with 25 or more workers (effective
July 26, 1994 in the case of employers with 15
or more employees). The officials charged
with carrying out the statute explain that it will
take extended litigation to determine the full
scope of the vague and often sweeping provisions of the law, which covers an estimated 43
million Americans. However, early experience
indicates that the costs will be substantial. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is

Amidst all the scary headlines about massive layoffs, some important but undramatic
perspective is necessary. It is true that, in recent months, IBM, P&G, et al. have announced unprecedented large reductions in
their work forces. But one of the best kept
secrets in the U.S. economy continues to be
that the total number of jobs is growing. Net
job expansion from late 1991 to late 1993 has
averaged a little over 1 percent a year.
However, that is far below the rate of employment growth during typical recoveries. We
should be able to improve on that record.
The upbeat point that needs to be made is
that the concern with removing governmental
obstacles to job creation is reasonable and
manageable. There is no need to throw up our
hands in despair. There are many reasons for
the slowdown in job formation in the American
economy and some of them are amenable to
sensible policy changes.
Surely, an important and often overlooked
factor is the rising load of regulation and mandates that government is imposing on business
and other employers. The direct cost of meeting employment mandates imposed by the
federal government has risen far faster than
wages and salaries. Federal mandates were
equal to almost 3 percent of total wages and
salaries in 1960.
By 1990, the ratio of
mandated benefits to wages and salaries had
more than doubled, to over 7 percent. It is one
thing for the proponents of these mandates and
regulations to justify them on social grounds.
Many, if not most of them, would flunk the
benefit-cost test. If that was not the case, why
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The cost of workers' compensation
rose to $55 billion in 1991.

do the proponents of more employment regulations - such as the Comprehensive OSHA Reform Act - urge Congress to keep economic
analysis out of the regulation-writing process?
The indirect costs of employment regulations- many of which are both substantial and
hidden - all share a common characteristic:
they make adding workers to the payroll more
expensive. At least initially, they also create a
substantial gap between the cost to the
employer and the benefit to the employee.
These facts are often lost amidst political debates on these issues.
Many times, more
regulation seems a costless way to achieve
policy goals.

The costs of employment regulations
share a common characteristic:
they make adding workers to the
payroll more expensive.

Merely reviewing the estimates presented in
this paper is staggering (see Table 2). Compliance with the civil rights laws may cost the
American economy as much as $236 billion a
year or 4 percent of the gross domestic product. Wrongful termination lawsuits may result
in lowering employment by 2 to 5 percent.
Mandating health care may involve the loss of
3.1 million jobs. In addition, employer costs
are rising rapidly for workers' compensation.
Moreover, the Clinton Administration appears
to be developing further impositions on the job
creation process, such as another increase in
the statutory minimum wage.
In the words of University of Chicago law
professor Richard A. Epstein, "Public discourse proceeds as if employment laws are un-
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Table 2

Estimates of Economic Cost for Major
Employment Regulations and Mandates

Program
1.

Civil rights
programs

Estimated Cost
$236 billion a year (or
4% ofGDP)

2. Wrongful
termination
lawsuits

2-5% lower employment

3. Parental leave
insurance costs

$674 million a year

4. Mandated
health care

3.1 million fewer jobs

5. Compulsory
minimum wage

1-3 % increase in
unemployment for
each 1Oo/o increase
in minimum wage

6. Comprehensive
OSHA Reform

$62 billion a year

7. Workers'
compensation

$55 billion a year

Sources: As cited in text: (1) see endnote no. 3;
(2) see endnote no. 5; (3) see endnote no.
6; (4) see endnote no. 11 ; (5) see endnote
no. 17; (6) see endnote no. 33; (7) see
endnote no. 34.
related to wage levels, job creation, or labor
output . . . . "36 His colleague, economist Sam
Peltzman, states the matter more pungently:
"People who say there is no trade-off between
19

regulation and employment are smoking something. "37
On occasion, we can find specific evidence
to support the close - and inverse - relationship between onerous government regulation
and the willingness to hire. Here are two recent examples:
WorldClass Process Inc., a new and growing Pittsburgh processor of flat -rolled steel
coils, has increased its work force to 49.
According to the company's chief financial
officer, "We're going to keep at 49 as long as
we can," in order to avoid being subject to the
50 or more employees threshold for coverage
under the Family Leave Act. 38
Similarly, the Schonstedt Instrument Company of Reston, Virginia, a profitable, hightech firm, deliberately keeps its work force
below 50 employees. It does so in order to
avoid having to file Form EE0-1 every year.
The company's president makes the point
effectively, although not in scholarly fashion:
. . . a friend went over 50 employees on a
government contract. He gave me his EEO
file . . . it weighs more than 8 pounds . . . I
have kept my employment under 50.39

Perhaps fate will arrange a meeting between
Mr. Schonstedt and Ira Magaziner. The tooth
fairy could serve as the referee.
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